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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the district court correctly ruled that the applicable language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(l), which states that cc[a] therapist has no duty to warn or 
take precautions to provide protection from any violent behavior of his client or 
patient/5 barred Plaintiffs5 negligence claims against the Mount Logan Clinic even if 
those negligence claims are characterized as arising from a negligent affirmative act 
rather than a failure to act. 
The district court5s decision is reviewed for correctness in light of the 
undisputed facts as found by the district court, which facts are not challenged on 
appeal. Arnold Indus, v. Love, 2002 UT 133, 63 P.3d 721. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to 
provide protection from any violent behavior of his client or 
patient, except when that client or patient communicated to the 
therapist an actual threat of physical violence against a clearly 
identified or reasonably identifiable victim. That duty shall be 
discharged if the therapist makes reasonable efforts to 
communicate the threat to the victim, and notifies a law 
enforcement officer or agency of the threat. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(l) (1996). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. References to Parties. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants are Mark Robinson ("Robinson"), a Logan police officer, 
and his wife, Lori Robinson (collectively "Plaintiffs35 herein). (R. 4 - 5.) 
Defendant/Appellant Mount Logan Clinic, L.L.C. ("Mount Logan") is a clinic 
employing therapists, including therapist Harris ("Ms. Harris"), who called the 
Logan Police department to transport a potentially suicidal patient from the clinic to 
a secure facility. (R. 5.) 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Plaintiffs do not challenge the following facts material to the district court's 
decision, and they are undisputed: 
L On October 4, 2002, Mount Logan's therapist, Ms. Harris, called 
Logan City dispatch in connection with a suicidal patient requesting police officers 
to escort the patient to a behavioral health unit at Logan Regional Hospital. (R. 5, 
93.) 
2. During the call, police dispatch asked, "He doesn't have any weapons or 
anything like that?" And Ms. Harris responded, "No." (R. 16, 93.) Plaintiffs do 
not allege Ms. Harris actually knew the patient had a weapon, but alleges she knew 
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enough that she should have ccascertain[ed] whether [the patient] was carrying a 
concealed weapon/5 (R. 6-7.) 
3. Logan City dispatch sent Robinson and Officer Nazer, another Logan 
City Policeman, to Mount Logan to escort the suicidal patient. (R. 5, 93.) 
4. After Robinson and his partner arrived at Mount Logan, but before the 
physical confrontation with the patient began, Ms. Harris warned the officers that 
the patient might have a gun. (R. 6, 93-94.) 
5. Robinson and his partner attempted to physically escort the patient out 
of the clinic, and a struggle ensued. During the struggle, a gun concealed in the 
patient's waistband was either intentionally or unintentionally discharged, and the 
round struck Robinson in the foot. (R. 6-7, 94.) 
6. Plaintiffs subsequendy filed a Complaint asserting Mount Logan was 
negligent because it "breached its duty of care to Officer Robinson55 in "failing to 
ascertain whether [the patient] was carrying a concealed weapon; failing to disclose 
to Logan City Police Department information which would have put the police on 
notice that [the patient] may have been carrying a gun; and affirmatively 
representing to the police that [the patient] did not have a gun.55 (R. 7, 94.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs3 argument is premised upon a distinction between failing to act to 
protect another person and actually undertaking to act on another's behalf, which 
distinction may determine whether a duty of care arises at all under traditional tort 
law principles. Plaintiffs labor to explicate the distinction, and then baldly assert that 
§ 78-14a-102(l) does not apply to a duty arising from the negligent performance of 
an affirmative act. Thus Plaintiffs argue that because Ms. Harris undertook to 
respond to the dispatcher's question about whether the patient had a gun, instead of 
failing to act at all, Ms. Harris could be found liable for negligence regardless of the 
limitations imposed by § 78-14a-102. 
Plaintiffs3 argument fails because the genesis of the alleged tort duty, whether 
allegedly arising from a failure to act or from the act of responding to a question in 
an allegedly negligent manner, is unimportant under the unambiguous terms of the 
controlling statute. The statute precludes, without limitation, any duty to take 
action which constitutes "precautions to provide protection from any violent 
behavior" of a patient. Because an alleged duty to ensure the completeness and 
accuracy of information provided to the police constitutes taking just such 
precautions to provide protection, the statue bars Plaintiffs5 Complaint here. The 
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district court correcdy dismissed Plaintiffs3 Complaint against Mount Logan as a 
matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTINCTION PLAINTIFFS DRAW BETWEEN A FAILURE 
TO ACT AND AN ALLEGEDLY NEGLIGENT AFFIRMATIVE ACT 
IS NOT IMPORTANT UNDER PLAIN TERMS OF SECTION 
78-14a-102, AND BY ITS UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE THE 
STATUTE BARS PLAINTIFFS5 NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS AGAINST 
MOUNT LOGAN. 
In their brief, Plaintiffs describe at length the common-law distinction 
between a failure to act and an affirmative act allegedly performed in a negligent 
manner. Aplts.5 Br., 7-12. CC[A] party who assumes a duty not otherwise owed must 
do so in a non-negligent manner." Id at 12. ccWhat plaintiffs [] claim is that, 
regardless of whether [Mount Logan] initially had any duty to act, when [Mount 
Logan] did act, it had duty to do so in a non-negligent manner.35 IcL at 7. 
According to Plaintiffs, therefor, § 78-14a-102 does not apply because ccit addresses 
only the failure-to-act prong of negligence law, . . . it says nothing to exempt 
therapists from liability for negligently performing an affirmative act.53 Id. at 13. 
Plaintiffs5 bald assertion, that the statute does not apply to the particular duty 
they allege arose in this case, is not supported by the unambiguous terms of 
§ 78-14a-102(l). The broad language, ccno duty to . . . take precautions to provide 
protection from any violent behavior from a client," makes no distinction between a 
duty allegedly arising from a failure to warn or take other action and a duty arising 
from the affirmative act of undertaking to respond to a question and doing so in an 
allegedly negligent manner. The language precluding a duty ccto take precautions to 
provide protection from any violent behavior" is plainly inclusive of alleged duties to 
accurately perform even some assumed obligation of protection. 
Stated another way, the alleged duty ccto ascertain whether [the patient] was 
carrying a concealed weapon" in order ccnot to affirmatively misrepresent a hazard," 
which Plaintiffs assert Mount Logan owes, is simply a form or characterization of a 
duty to "take precautions to provide protection from any violent behavior," which 
the statute obviates. Plaintiffs ask the Court to hold otherwise based upon their own 
ipse dixit, but provide no analysis whatsoever of the unambiguous statutory 
language. 
Rather than relying on a party's characterizations of its claims, this Court will 
look to the substance of what is alleged. See, e.g., Tensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 
H 34,130 P.3d 325 (noting that ccwe pay little heed to the labels placed on a 
particular claim, favoring instead an evaluation based upon the essence and substance 
of the claim."). The "essence and substance" of Plaintiffs5 claim here is that 
Ms. Harris should have taken precautions to protect Plaintiffs which she did not 
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take, ccascertain[ing] whether [the patient] was carrying a concealed weapon/3 and 
responding accurately to the dispatcher's question. A duty to take such precautions 
is precluded by § 78-14a-102, regardless of whether Plaintiffs claim the duty arises 
from an affirmative act rather than a failure to act. 
Moreover, in Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416 (Utah 1998), 
this Court expressly rejected such characterizations of claims to avoid the statutory 
bar. Plaintiffs in Wilson attempted to characterize the duty as something other than 
a duty to warn or take precautions to provide protection: cc[t]he [plaintiffs] filed 
their complaint in this case, alleging that Valley Mental Health breached its duty by 
not properly treating [the patient].33 Wilson, 969 P.2d at 417 (emphasis added). 
See also id. at 418: 
[T]he [plaintiffs] contend that even though the Code so limits 
the listed persons5 liability, under our case law, or a logical 
extension thereof, Valley Mental Health had a duty to properly 
treat or control [the patient]. They argue that because Valley 
Mental Health failed to treat [the patient] it failed to discover the 
threat to Jayleen and the children. Therefore, a duty to Jayleen 
and her children exists under the common law because Valley 
Mental Health should have known of the threat [the patient] 
posed based on the grounds that breached its duty by not 
properly treating [the patient]. 
However, the Court rejected the plaintiffs3 characterizations of the duty, holding 
that: 
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section 78-14a-101 exclusively defines the duty of a therapist in 
cases where it is alleged that a therapist had a duty to warn or 
take precautions to provide protection from the violent behavior 
of a client. There is no such duty unless there is an actual threat 
of physical violence against a clearly identified or reasonably 
identifiable victim communicated by the patient to the therapist. 
Id. at 421 (emphasis added). 
In their brief, Plaintiffs rely heavily on Boone v. Rivera, 80 Cal.App.4th 1322 
(2000) (Aplts.' Br. pp. 7-10), which is both factually and legally distinguishable. In 
Boone, the defendant who called for police assistance "knew there was an M16 rifle 
and a gun safe in the house, and that [the perpetrator] had threatened to kill the first 
police officer that arrived at the residence.'3 80 Cal.App.4th at 1326 (emphasis 
added). Nevertheless, in calling for police assistance the defendant had informed 
police that the perpetrator was "not violent" and that "she did not know the type or 
number of guns in the house." Id The plaintiff Boone was the first officer 
responding to the scene, and the perpetrator shot the officer precisely as he had 
threatened to do. Id 
Not surprisingly, the Boone court focused heavily on the extent the harm that 
befell the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant to distinguish other cases 
utilizing a common-law, special relationship analysis: 
In Tilley, the Court concluded an attack on the officer was 
not a foreseeable result of the doctor's conduct. Here, both the 
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victim (Boone) and the harm (an immediate assault by an armed 
[perpetrator]) were foreseeable given [defendant's] affirmative 
misrepresentation that [the perpetrator] was not violent despite 
his known threats to kill an officer and other violent propensities. 
Based on the facts alleged, we conclude [the defendant] owed a 
duty of care to Boon not to misrepresent the nature of the hazard 
that he had encountered. 
Id at 1333. More significantly, the California court did not parse the language of a 
statute remotely akin to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102, but interpreted a California 
statute it interpreted as ccreimposing a ca duty of ordinary care which would 
otherwise be abrogated by the fireman's rule.553 Id at 1330 (citing Cal. Civil Code 
§ 17149.9). 
In this case, by contrast, Plaintiffs have not and cannot allege that Mount 
Logan's patient made any threat to harm Robinson or any other police officer. He 
had threatened to harm only himself, and the therapist made the police aware of that 
threat. Although Plaintiffs characterize Ms. Harris5 statement that the patient did 
not have a gun as an ccaffirmative misrepresentation,55 they cannot allege she actually 
knew that the patient had concealed a gun on his person. The harm that occurred in 
this case was not the result of the patient acting on any specific threat to harm a 
particular plaintiff, but resulted undisputedly during a struggle when the police were 
attempting to disarm him and may not have been an intentional act at all. 
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In light of these distinctions, the comments of the California court in a more 
factually analogous case rejecting Boone and finding no duty of care are more 
applicable, and also illustrate that applying § 78-14a-102(l) to bar claims in this case 
advances public policy. In Alvarez v. Tacmar Pacific Pizza Corp., 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 
890, 907,100 Cal.App.4th 1190,1213 (Cal.App. 2002), the Court reviewed facts 
involving a defendant's alleged failure to inform police that a perpetrator of murder 
had threatened to return to the scene of a fight. The Court rejected the plaintiffs3 
citation of Boone, and noted in pertinent part as follows: 
The analysis advanced by the dissent is not persuasive 
given its public policy implications. In a nutshell, the dissent 
would fasten liability upon a restaurant for a murder carried out 
by a third party because one restaurant employee did not provide 
information to the police which may have been pertinent to their 
deciding how to handle the situation. Guerrero (or any 
employee) cannot be faulted for failing to realize the significance 
the police would place on particular statements (i.e., the 
postulate we ccwould be coming back55) or for not knowing what 
information the police need to determine the appropriate course 
of action. . . . 
When the police arrived at the scene, it was their 
responsibility to conduct an investigation adequate to address the 
situation. The record certainly discloses there were numerous 
individuals, including the Alvarez group, who had pertinent 
information had the police contacted them. It was not the 
responsibility of the restaurant or its employees to ensure all 
relevant information was conveyed to the police. Indeed, they 
cannot be presumed to know what constitutes all relevant 
information. To impose that responsibility would require a 
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commercial enterprise to understand the subdeties or nuances of 
police procedure, an obligation supported neither by policy nor 
common sense. 
Law enforcement is trained to investigate and prevent 
crime. This includes a proper investigation at the scene of an 
altercation such as that found in this case. To shift that burden to 
a pizza parlor is simply not good policy. In sum, to the extent 
the restaurant had any duty, it performed that duty when it called 
911. To conclude otherwise impermissibly shifts the burden of 
effective law enforcement from the police to those who witness a 
problem and call for police intervention. Citizens would dial 911 
at their peril. 
122 Cal.Rptr.2d at 907,100 Cal.App.4th at 1213. 
Similarly, it would be poor policy to strain the language of § 78-14a-102(l) 
to impose a duty on the therapist calling for police assistance here. While there were 
allegedly indications the patient might have a gun, the patient had not threatened 
anyone specifically, besides himself, and requiring the therapist to institute a search 
or to question the patient to ensure the accuracy of information provided to dispatch 
might have had undesirable consequences. Rather, public policy is served when 
therapists needing assistance in potentially dangerous situations are encouraged to 
summon aid from police who are trained to deal with such situations, regardless of 
how the call for assistance might be characterized after the fact. 
In short, Plaintiffs3 argument that § 78-14a-101 does not apply here because 
"when [Mount Logan] did act, it had a duty to do so in a non-negligent manner35 
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fails to address the applicable statutory language and relies upon cases that are 
inapposite. The applicable language of the Utah statute precludes any duty to take 
action which constitutes "precautions to provide protection from any violent 
behavior55 of a client. Because the actions Plaintiffs allege Mount Logan should have 
taken to prevent their injuries constitute just such precautions to provide protection, 
whether by failing to act or by acting in a different manner, the district court 
correcdy held that the statue bars Plaintiffs5 Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Mount Logan respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the district court's judgment and order dismissing Plaintiffs5 Complaint 
against Mount Logan. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jr.day of April, 2007. 
W I L L I M ^ ^ 
Robert C. Keller 
Attorneys for Appellees 
134410.1 
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